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Economic development in the People's Republic of China has
been predicated on the basis of "technological dualism": the use
of both modern, imported, large-scale, capital-intensive indust-
rial technologies and of traditional, native, small-scale, labour-
intensive technologies, particularly in agriculture and consumer
industries. These two economic sectors also coincide loosely with
the State-owned sector of industry and the locally-owned sector -
provincial, county, special district, municipal and county enter-
prises. In both sectors, a process of technological innovation is
expected to increase labour productivity, bringing about develop-
ment to higher levels of technology. For the modern sector, this
may involve the adaptation of imported technology to suit
production conditions in China, as well as the invention of
original "high" technologies. The traditional sector is to
develop through the gradual addition of labour-saving techniques.
Although the tactics for technological development have varied
over the past 22 years, the strategy has remained remarkably
consistent. Equally, a critical problem has persisted as a
constraint on the realization of policy: the development of a
base of technical skills appropriate for innovation and
development in the two sectors of technology. The persistence
of this problem can be interpreted as a consequence of the
institutional structure of the Chinese science and technology
system - a structure and a problem shared by China with many
developing countries.
The Great Leap Forward (1958-60)
The first Five Year Plan (1953-1957) emphasized capital
construction and heavy industry in the State-owned sector,
relying on the transfer of Soviet technology and technological
know-how in 156 'key projects'. The supply of agricultural
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tools and equipment and of consumer manufactures had largely
been left to locally-owned (i.e. by units below State level)
industries and had been comparatively neglected in the Plan.
By 1955/56, however, the unexpectedly rapid re-organization of
agricultural production and the improvement of agricultural
techniques envisaged in the Draft Program for Agricultural
Devclopmctt 1956-1967 had generated demands for new techno-
logies on a scale which could not be met by the locally-owned
industries. In order to conserve State resources of investment
capital and foreign reserves for the heavy industrial sector and
to maintain the concentration of scarce scientific, technical
and engineering skills in the capital goods and military sectors,
while at the same time accommodating political and economic
pressures for more productive agricultural and light industrial
technologies, Chinese policy-makers encouraged a 'mass campaign
for technological innovation' in the local, small-scale
industries supplying consumer goods and agricultural equipment.
In May 1968, the Report of the Central Committee to the
8th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party stated
the objectives of the new technology policy:
"To put the national economy, including agriculture
and handicrafts, systematically and in a planned way
on a new technological basis, i.e. the technological
basis of modern, large scale production, so that
machinery can be used wherever feasible and electri-
fication is brought to all the cities and villages
of the country".
But State investment in the modernization of the technological
base of the national economy would be postponed for the immediate
future:
"While introducing as far as possible the world's
up-to-date techniques, to launch a widespread mass
movement in the cities and villages throughout the
country to improve tools and introduce technical
innovations so that semi-mechanized or fully mechanized
operations can be properly combined with the necessary
hand work".
In the face of pressing demand for rapid economic growth
and perceptible technological development*, this tactic was meant
* Note that the Central Committee's Report was presented by
Liu Shao-ch'i, who has subsequently been identified with
antithetical policies for economic and industrial development.
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to buy time, by diffusing rapid, although limited, technological
change as widely as possible, until the heavy industrial sector
could provide modern capital equipment to the rest of the economy.
This 'cultural revolution' initiated a 'mass movement' for
technological innovation. Inventions devised by workers on the
basis of their practical experience would and 'renovate'
simple tools and equipment and eventually substitute machinery
and the use of power for manual processes. The notion of 'mass
innovation' stemmed from the Marxist concept of technology as
'the summation of labour in action', the fruit of many years'
practice by the working people'. Innovation, or change in
production technology from a lower to a higher level of pro-
ductivity, is the outcome of production experience - directly,
through familiarity with existing technology, and indirectly,
through knowledge of 'theory'. The purpose of the 'cultural
revolution' was, to create social institutions which would tap
this reservoir of experience.
The campaign for 'technological and cultural revolution'
was, itself, an educational device which aimed to create a
widespread awarenesss of the possibility and the benefits of
technological change: "The masses now know that the conquest
of nature is not a formidable task beyond their means". This
awarenesss, in turn, created an impetus for technological
modernization and a political force against technological
conservatism. In the face of such political pressures,
factory managers would be obliged to adopt 'mass innovations';
the greater these pressures, the more undiscriminating became
the adoption procedure.
The source of 'mass' innovations is the worker's familiarity
with the technology he uses, which enables him to recognize ways
to change and improve it. The broader his own experience and
his knowledge of other's experience, the greater his resources
for making improvements. Historically, the development of
separate institutions for production and for education had
separated the 'two roads to invention and discovery', one
starting from direct personal experience, the other from 'theory',
or accumulated experience. The structure of social institutions
built on this distinction, in the Chinese view, repressed
invention based on experience, but also prevented theory -
sciance - from being applied to technological change. The
'cultural revolution' was an attempt to close the gap by
adding technical education to the worker's practical experience
in order to expand his inventive capacity. Innovation, the use
of new inventions, would in turn be facilitated by attendant
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improvements in the technical skills of the workers, who would
operate and maintain the new and more complicated technologies
and fulfill management and technical control functions. To this
end, facilities for technical and scientific training after
working hours were provided for workers by the factories where
they were employed. By 1960, it was reported, 'an overwhelming
majority' of enterprises had established spare-time training
classes, technical schools, and universities, and 4.56 rtillion
workers had been enrolled.
The campaigns to improve the technical skills of the labour
force, to popularize knowledge of elementary science, and to
raise the scientific and technical qualifications of Party cadres
were one aspect of the effort to integrate technological know-how
with the actual operation of technology and control of technolo-
gical change. The other aspect was an attempt to re-structure the
social institutions which dominated science-based innovation.
This institutional in the Chinese view,
enforced its control of technology and technological change - and
thus its political position - by propagating the 'mystique' of
science and the 'superstition' that technological change was
impossible without the thoretical knowledge which it, alone,
possessed. The 'cultural revolution' aimed, first, to break
this monopoly on theoretical knowledge, and second, to find
alternative sources of technological innovation.
whatever the extent to which criticism of scientists and
technicians stemmed from fear of the political power implied by
their economic role - and the Hundred Flowers campaign only
two years before had revealed the dissatisfaction of many
intellectuals - the charges against them describe, in many
respects, the syndrome of science in developing countries.
Thus it is plausible that the attacks on Chinese scientists and
technicians at this time were not motivated solely by political
or ideological considerations, but stemmed from the specific
failure of the scientific establishment to fulfill an economic
function prescribed for it. The experience of other developing
countries suggests, further, that the failure of science to
play an economic role reflected the inadequacy of the institut-
ional framework within which 'science' in developing countries
operates.
Yet at no point did the Chinese absolutely deny the role
of scientists and technicians in economic development. In
innovation, their function was to evaluate and select
particularly 'advanced' experiences and 'raise them to the level
of theory'; this presumably referred to the experimental develop-
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ment and testing of worker innovations in preparation for
diffusing such innovations beyond the original point of
invention. In fact, the re-emergence of scientists and
technicians from political limbo, starting in 1961, was
couched specifically in terms of the essential role of
scientific and technical services in technological develop-
ment.
The 'mass innovations' which were inspired by this
campaign consisted of minor improvements to existing tech-
nology, substitution of locally available factors for scarce
raw materials and intermediates, labour-intensive renovation
and maintenance of outmoded and worn equipment, etc. The
objective of the 'mass campaign', in other words, was to
raise total output by inventing ad hoc techniques for the
full exploitation of resources not usable in more productive
industrial sectors. It was acknowledged that these techniques
would have relatively low levels of productivity compared to
modern, capital intensive technologies; nonetheless, they
represented improvements over the levels attained with
existing labour-intensive techniques. Mass campaigns in the
previous two years had led to such wide-scale adoption of
low productivity techniques that the new economic policies
calling for a 'great leap forward in production' induced a
labour shortage.1 In the absence of substantial capital
investment, which was not available on the scale required
for nation-wide 'technological transformation', the answer,
of necessity, was to raise total productivity in this sector
through minor improvement innovations on existing capital
stock.
The total addition to output which would result from
widespread diffusion of limited technological change and
from the mobilization of hitherto unused or underutilized
resources was expected to offset whatever costs were incurred
in order to achieve these minor improvements in productivity.
Among the advantages claimed for 'native' innovations over
'foreign' technology were low initial investment costs, short
time required for construction and installation, simplicity of
operation and low skill requirements, and utilization of poor
quality raw materials - all of these factors which would
facilitate local investment in technological innovation,
without requiring State resources. In effect, almost all
opportunity costs to the development of the heavy industrial
sector could thus be avoided.
1
It should be noted that, in the real world, technologies,
once embodied in fixed capital, cannot easily be changed.
43
Because the pattern of 'left-over' resources would vary
from locality to locality, most of these innovations could
not be standardized for diffusion beyond the point of original
invention. What was to be diffused, therefore, was inventiveness
and an innovative capability. This effort is seen, on the one
hand, in the Central Committee's directive to establish
research facilities at provincial, autonomous region, district
and county level, and to establish regional branches of the
Academy of Sciences. This so stretched limited resources of
professional scientific manpower, however, that within two
years these plans had to be largely written off. On the other
hand, experienced workers were encouraged to apply their
practical knowledge to the improvement of familiar techniques.
* * *
While the use of low-productivity technologies in small-
scale industry did increase total output temporarily, this
achievement was bought by concentrating all resources on
production, at the expense of such 'non-productive' technical
functions as maintenance and repair of equipment, product testing
and standardization, etc. When the requirements of local, small-
scale industry were permitted by political circumstances to
intrude on the modern, State-owned sector, development of the
less productive industries was halted, and many of the small
plants were closed down or merged into large units, with worker-
innovations either being discarded on technical grounds or
taken up for further development by professional technicians
and engineers. Because non-economic factors came to govern the
allocation of factors of production between the two industrial
sectors, the Great Leap exrerience is, ultimately, not a valid
test of the choice of techniques mode. Nor does the Great Leap
demonstrate the full innovative potential of small-scale, labour
intensive technologies. Because institutional structures deprived
this sector of specialized technical skills, the development of
these technologies to higher levels of productivity was aborted.
This, in turn, nullified one of the arguments used to justify
innovation in small-scale industry: that limited technological
innovation on the existing technological base promotes non-
disruptive social change and creates new patterns in the organi-
zation of production which anticipate the eventual use of
(capital-intensive) more productive technologies. This experience
and the lessons learned from it are, I believe, the basis of
innovation policies in China for the succeeding ten years.
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After the Great Leap
The basis of the new set of arguments was that, following
the upsurge in output in the Great Leap Forward, priority should
now be given to increasing the variety and improving the quality
of products; and 'an increase in variety and improvement in
quality are more dependent on a rise in the technical level than
is an increase in the quantity of products'. Innovation in the
course of production, 'mass' innovation, can realize the potent-
ial of existing technology for higher productivity through modif-
ications and improvements to capital equipment and processes
already in use. But the invention of wholly new technologies was
now asserted to be a specialized function, distinct from product-
ion.
Some of the consequences of technological change without
scientific and technical services, such as were experienced in
the 'mass' innovation campaign, may be inferred from the arguments
now advanced in favour of technical specialisation. First, the
enforcement of product standards had been suspended as technical
supervisory and evaluation facilities were devoted to production,
and, in the all-out drive to raise production, goods of inferior
quality had been included in output quotas. Now it was proposed
that 'technical evaluation' be carried out at the design and
trial manufacture stages as well as during production, and that
consumer opinion be solicited. Secondly, production by small,
uncoordinated units had resulted in the proliferation of specif-
ications and standards, thus requiring specially-designed spare
parts and accessories, wasting designing capacity on special
orders, and inhibiting multiple-use of goods and mass production
in general. Finally, maintenance and repair was neglected.
Therefore, it was argued, the 'front line', production,
required the support of 'technical rear services', which included
repair and assembly of equipment; measurement survey and tests;
designing; inspection; research and experiment; and the collect-
ion of technical data and the maintenance of archives. Innovat-
ion, or 'development of new products', was among the technical
services which support production. Innovation was now seen to
involve research, experiment and design, trial manufacture,
technical evaluation at the trial production stage, and reorgan-
ization of labour prior to mass production.
The Role of Scientific and Technicál Services (STS)
The Chinese interpretation of the economic function of
'technical rear services' seems to be based on a concept of con-
tradiction between STS and short-term production increase; the
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role of STS is to 'consolidate' the production gains which are
achieved by devoting all resources to increasing productivity.
This concept leads to the notion of extraordinary periods when
STS are suspended in order to concentrate all resources on in-
creasing output, followed by periods when the increases are con-
solidated by 'technical evaluation': "Only when new achievements
are made will technical evaluation be required. Under ordinary
circumstances, therefore, technical evaluation always lags
behind the emergence of new achievements and the trial manufacture
of new products". In other words, if increases in production are
to be more than ephemeral, testing, standardization, measurement,
and maintenance functions must all be performed, in order to
maintain the new levels of output.
STS were discussed in the context of modern industry in China;
small-scale 'native' technology did not enter the discussions, and
the concept of a 'choice' of technologies seems to have been dropped
Instead, it was emphasized that modern industries and technological
modernization require STS.
A second difference between the policies of the previous
three years and these arguments was the reversal of the order of
priorities between 'practice' and 'theory' as a source of inven-
tion and innovation. Technology was now seen to be based on
'scientUic and technical laws' rather than 'practice' or exper-
ience: technology is something larger than can be comprehended by
the worker. The worker can devise improvements for that part of
technology with which he is familiar but responsibility for tech-
nological change and development rests with specialized technical
staff.
"Mass movements of technical innovation and technical
revolution must be constantly launched in relation to
production in industrial enterprises. Workers should be
urged to make rationalization proposals, toward which
enterprise leaders should adopt an attitude of active
welcome. All proposals, the effectiveness of which has
been confirmed by experiments, should be applied to pro-
duction through definite procedures. This is an important
aspect in promoting technical developments in industry.
But the mass movements in technical work must be integrated
with the strict technical control work, because modern
industrial production continuously calls for a higher
degree of organization and discipline. Regulations and
systems concerning technical work ... are all important
provisions for insuring normal production from the angle
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of technical order ... Technical regulations and systems
are the summing up of technical theories, and there are
many reasons for this, which cannot be quickly and
entirely comprehended by the people doing the actual
work. Hence there is the greater need to emphasize
discipline and arbitrary practices must never be per-
mitted."
Over the next 2 or 3 years, STS gradually re-emerged as a
specialized activity in production, but there is a dearth of
information from this period. Sometime in 1963 a 10 Year Plan
for Science and Technology in Light Industry was prepared, but
the details have never been published and its existence was not
announced until 1965 when it had already been in force for 2
years. Presumably in this Plan or at any rate at some time in
this period, new institutional forms were introduced to sustain
technological change. These were essentially new forms of link-
ing existing institutions - i.e., integrating more closely the
various stages of the innovation process, but still maintaining
a functional distinction among them. Production, research, and
training were linked together on the basis of permanent or semi-
permanent relationships among research institutes, factories and
schools and, within production units, STS were performed by
teams composed of technicians, workers and management cadres.
Research and design were to be coordinated with production by
involving designers in the trial manufacture and production
stages of product development. Just what these various forms of
'triple combination' entailed is not clear; a reasonable guess
is that with some few exceptions, a fair amount of formalism
but relatively little substance characterized these arrange-
ments. By 1966, the Vice Minister of the First Ministry of
Machine-Building wrote in the Peaple'8 Daily of the 'failure'
of the practice of 'triple combination' during the previous
few years. Nonetheless, the '3-in-l' team is the institutional
form which still appears to dominate STS in Chinese factories,
through the Cultural Revolution to the present day. The direct-
ion of Chinese technology policy since the inception of this
form has probably been toward trying to make this institution
function as prescribed. The 'failure' of the new institution
occurred because it conflicted with the inherited patterns and
values of conventional scientific and technical institutions.
Read in this light, the Cultural Revolution is seen as an
effort to change those patterns and values, to substitute active
coninitment on the part of scientists to broad economic and
social goals in place of 'science for science's sake'. The
Cultural Revolution has not seen institutional innovations in the
science and technology system as such, but rather, innovations in
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the way such institutions function. It cannot yet be said that the
Chinese have developed an original model of scientific institut-
ions; but what perhaps is unique in the Chinese model, certainly
among developing economies, is the degree to which extra-scient-
ific goals and objecUves have penetrated the science system:
the degree to which the science system is being made to respond
to the demands of the larger social system.
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